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ABSTRACT 
EOSIO is one typical public blockchain platform. It is scalable in 
terms of transaction speeds and has a growing ecosystem supporting 
smart contracts and decentralized applications. However, the 
vulnerabilities within the EOSIO smart contracts have led to serious 
attacks, which caused serious financial loss to its end users. In this 
work, we systematically analyzed three typical EOSIO smart contract 
vulnerabilities and their related attacks. Then we presented 
EOSFuzzer, a general black-box fuzzing framework to detect 
vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts. In particular, 
EOSFuzzer proposed effective attacking scenarios and test oracles 
for EOSIO smart contract fuzzing. Our fuzzing experiment on 3963 
EOSIO smart contracts shows that EOSFuzzer is both effective and 
efficient to detect EOSIO smart contract vulnerabilities with high 
accuracy.  
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and privacy → Software and application security; 
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and debugging; 
KEYWORDS 
Fuzzing, Smart contract, Vulnerability detection, Blockchain 
1 Introduction  
The blockchain technology is proposed as a value transfer 
network among peers with limited trust. Currently, the blockchain 
technology has evolved as a trust machine with which untrusted 
peers can cooperate with each other. Most of the current blockchain 
platforms supports smart contracts with which developers can build 
Decentralized Applications (DApps). Among them, the ecosystem of 
EOSIO platform is growing steadily. The types of DApps range from 
game, gambling, decentralized exchanges, tools, microblogging, etc.  
However, the vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts have 
led to non-trivial financial loss to its end users. For example, the 
random number generation vulnerabilities within the EOSIO 
gambling games (including EOSBet, EOSCast, FFGame, EOSDice, 
EOSWin, etc.) have led to the loss of around 170K EOS tokens [28]. 
The Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability within the EOSCast smart 
contract has led to the loss of around 60K EOS tokens [26]. The 
Forged Transfer Notification vulnerability within EOSBet has led to 
the loss of 140K EOS tokens [27]. Based on the price of the EOS 
tokens (about $5 on average) at the time of the attack, the 
accumulated amount of loss by these three vulnerabilities alone was 
around 1.9 million worth of USD. Therefore, building effective 
vulnerability detection tools for EOSIO smart contracts is valuable. 
However, no existing fuzzing tool is available to detect EOSIO smart 
contract vulnerabilities. 
Different from the fuzzing of the Ethereum smart contracts, there 
are two main challenges with the fuzzing of EOSIO smart contracts. 
First, the EOSIO smart contracts adopt a unique EOS token transfer 
and notification mechanism through the eosio.token system smart 
contract, which can lead to distinctive EOSIO smart contracts 
vulnerabilities. To effectively trigger such vulnerabilities, we must 
design new attacker agents to trigger such vulnerabilities as well as 
new test oracles to precisely detect such vulnerabilities. Second, 
EOSIO smart contracts are executed by the WASM virtual machine, 
which supports different bytecode instruction sets from EVM. 
Furthermore, new types of vulnerabilities will continue to emerge 
with the development of EOSIO platform. Therefore, we must design 
the instrumentation scheme within the WASM VM in a general way 
to capture adequate information to support the detection of different 
types of EOSIO smart contract vulnerabilities. 
In this work, we proposed EOSFuzzer, a general blackbox fuzzing 
framework to detect vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts. 
EOSFuzzer includes a fuzzing input generator, a fuzzing executor, an 
instrumented Wasm VM, and a vulnerability detection engine. The 
fuzzing input generator can generate inputs based on the ABIs of the 
smart contracts and realize specific attacking scenarios with the agent 
smart contracts. The fuzzing executor can efficiently execute the 
generated inputs against the smart contract under fuzzing. The 
instrumented Wasm VM will collect opcode execution, API 
invocation and other execution information valuable for general 
vulnerability detection. Finally, the vulnerability detection engine 
implements the proposed test oracles to report vulnerabilities. Our 
experiment on 3963 smart contracts showed that EOSFuzzer is 
effective to detect vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts with 
high accuracy. In particular, we have successfully mounted attacks 
on smart contracts without source code using EOSFuzzer to make a 
bet without spending any EOS in our case study. 
* This research is supported in part by the National Key R&D Program of China 
under Grant 2019YFB2102400, NSFC (project no. 61772056),, the GRF of 
Research Grants Council (project no. 11214116, 11200015, and 11201114). 
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The contributions of this work are three-fold. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this work proposes the first fuzzing framework for 
detecting security vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts. 
Second, the work proposes effective attacking scenarios and the 
corresponding test oracles that can trigger and detect typical 
vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts with high accuracy. 
Third, we have systematically evaluated EOSFuzzer with a fuzzing 
experiment on real world EOSIO smart contracts, and EOSFuzzer 
has effectively identified more than 450 vulnerabilities within 
EOSIO smart contracts. 
The organization of the remaining sections is as follows. In 
Section 2, we will present the basics of WebAssembly (Wasm), 
EOSIO platform and EOSIO smart contracts. Then in Section 3, we 
will present 3 typical vulnerabilities of EOSIO smart contracts. In 
section 4, we will present the design of our EOSFuzzer framework in 
detail. After that, we will perform a comprehensive experimental 
study to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of EOSFuzzer in 
terms of vulnerability detection in Section 5. Then we present case 
studies about successful attacks on EOSIO smart contracts with 
EOSFuzzer in Section 6. Finally, we present related works, 
acknowledgements, and conclusions in Section 7, 8, and 9. 
2 Background  
In this section, we provide background knowledge on 
WebAssembly, EOSIO platform, and the EOSIO smart contracts. 
2.1 The WebAssembly 
WebAssembly (Wasm for short) [32] is a binary instruction 
format for a stack-based virtual machine. Wasm is designed as a 
portable target for compilation of high-level languages like 
C/C++/Rust, enabling deployment on the web for client and server 
applications. Wasm is designed to be fast, safe, and ease of 
debugging. And it can be easily embedded in both web and non-web 
execution environment. The EOSIO platform also adopts Wasm VM 
for executing its smart contract. 
2.2 EOSIO Platform and EOSIO Smart Contracts 
EOSIO platform is an open source public blockchain platform 
that focuses on the scalability of transaction speed. The EOS is not 
only the token of EOSIO platform, but it also represents the stake 
hold by its owners. The EOSIO platform adopts the Delegated Proof 
of Stake (DPoS) protocol for making consensus, which is much more 
scalable than the Proof of Work (PoW) consensus protocol used by 
other platforms such as Bitcoin. The computing resources is also 
distributed according to the EOS tokens owned by the users. 
Moreover, EOSIO platform has set an upper limit on the execution 
time of each transaction. Exceeding the resource limit will lead to the 
rollback of the transaction with exceptions.  
The features and characteristics of the EOSIO blockchain 
platform are designed to be flexible such that they can be modified to 
suit specific business requirement. Core blockchain features such as 
consensus, fee schedules, account creation and modification, token 
economics, etc., are implemented inside system smart contracts [30], 
which are deployed on the EOSIO blockchain platform. For example. 
The eosio.token system smart contract [24] defines the structures and 
actions allowing users to issue and transfer tokens on EOSIO based 
blockchains. The management of the EOS token is also performed by 
eosio.token system smart contract. 
Smart contracts are programs running on the blockchain platform 
to help manage the assets of end users or to enforce the negotiation 
and execution of agreements among peers participating in the 
blockchain platform. The smart contracts [29] deployed on EOSIO 
platform contain two parts: the WebAssembly bytecode and the 
Application Binary Interface (ABI). The smart contract source code 
is compiled into Wasm bytecode for execution within the Wasm VM. 
And the ABIs describe the public interfaces of the smart contract to 
interact with.  
Every EOSIO smart contract must provide an apply function as 
the entrance function to handle actions. The apply function will listen 
to all incoming actions and invoke the corresponding action handler 
functions accordingly. For example, the transfer function of a smart 
contract is usually used to handle transfer actions related to the 
contract [31]. 
The apply function uses the receiver, code, and action input 
parameters as filters to map the actions to the corresponding 
functions to handle [25]. The receiver is the account currently 
executing code. The code is the account that the action was originally 
sent to. And the action is the name of the action. It is important to 
understand the difference between code and receiver. To be specific, 
code is always the first receiver of the action, while receiver is the 
account currently executing the action. During the execution of a 
smart contract it may forward the action received to other account 
with the require_recipient() function. The code and action 
parameters of the apply function are also forwarded to the new 
contract. As a result, the receiver has changed to the newly notified 
contract, but the code stays the same. 
3 Security Bugs in EOSIO Smart Contracts 
In this section, we will briefly review the security bugs in EOSIO 
smart contracts. 
3.1 Fake EOS Transfer 
Table  1. The EOSBet Contract with Fake EOS Transfer 
Vulnerability 
1 … 
2 //The apply function 
3 void apply(uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action){ 
4 auto self = receiver; 
5 if (code == self || code == N(eosio.token) || action == N(onerror)){ 
6 TYPE thiscontract (self); 
7 switch( action ) { 
8 EOSIO_API(TYPE, MEMBERS) 
9 }}} 
 
In the expected scenario, an EOSIO smart contract will only 
accept EOS transferred via the eosio.token system contract. If the 
contract under attack is vulnerable in that it does not check the code 
is eosio.token when the action is transfer within its apply function, an 
attacker may call the transfer function within the contract directly to 
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fake an EOS transfer. As a result, the vulnerable contract may 
wrongly consider that the attacker has transferred EOS to it. 
As shown in Table  1, within the apply function of the EOSBet 
contract, it only checks whether the code is the contract itself or 
eosio.token, but it does not check whether the action transfer is 
originally sent to the eosio.token system smart contract. As a result, 
an attacker contract may directly call the transfer function of the 
vulnerable contract to make a bet without spending any EOS. 
Table  2. Attacker Contract of the Fake EOS Transfer 
Vulnerability 
1 class hackcontract : public eosio::contract { 
2 … 
3 void hack(account_name self, eosio::asset quantity, std::string 
memo) {  
4 eosio::action( 
5 eosio::permission_level{_self, N(active)}, 
6 N(eosbet), 
7 N(transfer), 
8 std::make_tuple(self, N(eosbet), quantity, memo)).send(); 
9 }}; 
 
As shown in Table  2, a hacker can use the attacker contract to 
exploit the fake EOS transfer vulnerability. The attack is simple: it 
directly performs an inline call to the transfer function of EOSBet.   
Table  3. The Fix of the Fake EOS Transfer Vulnerability 
1 … 
2 //The apply function 
3 void apply(uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, uint64_t action){ 
4 auto self = receiver; 
5 if( code == self || code == N(eosio.token) || action == N(onerror)){ 
6 if( action == N(transfer) ){ 
7 eosio_assert( code == N(eosio.token), "Must transfer EOS"); 
8 } 
9 … 
 
As shown in Table  3, The recommended way to fix the 
vulnerability is to add a check in the apply function to ensure 
eosio.token was the original receiver of the transfer action (line 6 and 
7). In another word, when the action is transfer, the code must be 
eosio.token. 
3.2 Forged Transfer Notification 
When the transfer function of a contract is called, a smart contract 
may never check the destination (i.e., to) of the transfer.  However, 
this is vulnerable since the smart contract may just receive a 
notification of a transfer to another contract rather than to itself. 
During a normal EOS transfer, a receiver contract can choose to 
forward the transfer notification to other accounts through 
require_recipient (i.e. send a carbon copy of the transfer action). 
During a forged transfer notification attack [22], the attacker controls 
two accounts A and B. Then the attacker initializes the attack by 
transferring EOS from A to B through the system contract 
eosio.token. When the transfer is successful, both A and B will 
receive transfer notification. However, the contract deployed within 
account B can deliberately forwards the transfer notification to 
another contract (eosbetcasino in this example) with the 
require_recipient function in order to mislead it as shown in Table  4.  
Table  4. The Attacker Code to Send Forged Transfer 
Notification 
1 class contractB : public eosio::contract { 
2 public: 
3 contractB(account_name self) : eosio::contract(self) {} 
4 void transfer(uint64_t sender, uint64_t receiver) { 
5 require_recipient( N(eosbetcasino)); 
6 } 
7 }; 
 
As shown in Table  5, the eosbetcasino is vulnerable in that it 
does not check whether the destination (i.e., data.to) of EOS transfer 
is itself within its transfer function. Then, it may wrongly consider 
that it has received the EOS. As a result, it may wrongly credit the 
attacker account A, who in fact has sent nothing to eosbetcasino.  
Table  5. The Smart Contract eosbetcasino 
1 class eosbetcasino : public eosio::contract { 
2 public: 
3 void transfer(uint64_t sender, uint64_t receiver) { 
4 auto data = unpack_action_data<st_transfer>(); 
5 if (data.from == _self) //no check for data.to 
6 return; 
7 doSomething(); 
8 } 
9 }; 
 
As shown in Table  6, the fix of the forged transfer notification 
vulnerability is to simply check the destination of the transfer (line 5). 
If the destination of the EOS transfer is not the current contract, then 
the contract should directly ignore the transfer notification.  
Table  6. The Fix of the Forged Transfer Notification 
Vulnerability 
1 class eosbetcasino : public eosio::contract { 
2 public: 
3 void transfer(uint64_t sender, uint64_t receiver) { 
4 auto data = unpack_action_data<st_transfer>(); 
5 if (data.from == _self || data.to != _self) 
6 return; 
7 doSomething(); 
8 } 
9 }; 
 
3.3 Block Information Dependency 
Due to the lack of source of randomness, an EOSIO smart 
contract may rely on the block information such as 
tapos_block_prefix and tapos_block_num to generate random 
numbers, which may in turn determine the transfer of EOS or the 
winner of a lottery. However, the tapos_block_prefix and 
tapos_block_num are not reliable source of randomness, because they 
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can be directly calculated from ref_block_num, which is the id of the 
last irreversible block by default.  
A gambling contract may use deferred action to determine the 
winner of a lottery. In such scenario, the reference block is the block 
just before the block making the bet. Therefore, when a smart 
contract uses tapos_block_prefix and tapos_block_num directly for 
random generation, the random number generated can be predicted.  
As shown in Table  7, the EOSDice smart contract [28] uses the 
tapos_block_prefix, tapos_block_num, current_time, account_name, 
game_id, pool_eos for random number generation. Unfortunately, it 
turns out all these variables can be determined before taking the bet. 
The account_name (name of the contract), game_id, and pool_eos 
(balance of the current contract) are trivial to get. The current_time 
refers to the timestamp when determine the winner of the lottery, 
which is the sum of the timestamp of making the bet and the delay 
time of the deferred action. As a result, all variables used for random 
number generation can be computed before making the bet. Finally, 
the attackers successfully calculated the random number and won 
2,545 EOS through the lottery, which was about $13,500. 
Table  7. EOSDice Contract with Block Info. Dependency 
Vulnerability 
1 uint8_t random(account_name name, uint64_t game_id){ 
2 … 
3 auto mixd = tapos_block_prefix() * tapos_block_num() + 
name + game_id - current_time() + pool_eos.amount; 
4 const char *mixedChar = reinterpret_cast<const char *>(&mixd); 
5 checksum256 result; 
6 sha256((char *)mixedChar, sizeof(mixedChar), &result); 
7 uint64_t random_num = *(uint64_t *)(&result.hash[0]) + 
*(uint64_t *)(&result.hash[8]) + *(uint64_t *)(&result.hash[16]) 
+ *(uint64_t *)(&result.hash[24]); 
8 return (uint8_t)(random_num % 100 + 1); 
9 } 
 
4 The Design of EOSFuzzer 
 
 
Fig. 1 The Workflow of EOSFuzzer 
In this section, we will first present an overview of the 
EOSFuzzer. Then we will discuss each component of the EOSFuzzer 
in detail. 
4.1 Overview of EOSFuzzer 
As shown in Fig. 1, the general workflow of EOSFuzzer mainly 
consists four steps. First, EOSFuzzer performs static analysis on the 
ABI (application binary interface) and the bytecode of the smart 
contract under test. The static analysis step outputs the data types of 
the arguments for each ABI interface as well as a candidate string 
pool for string data type and memo parameter. Second, the 
EOSFuzzer performs input generation to generate fuzzing inputs for 
each ABI interfaces based on the static analysis result. Meanwhile, 
the EOSFuzzer will also use deployed attacker agent contracts to 
generate attacking scenarios for triggering specific vulnerabilities. 
Third, the EOSFuzzer performs fuzzing on the smart contract under 
analysis within the testnet through the cleos tool [23]. Note that the 
testnet is an instrumented EOSIO platform with smart contracts 
deployed on it. Through instrumentation, the execution information 
of the smart contract under analysis will be recorded into the 
execution log. Fourth, the EOSFuzzer will perform vulnerability 
analysis based on our proposed test oracles. 
4.2 The Input Generator 
The input generator is responsible for generating the inputs for the 
ABI interfaces of EOSIO smart contracts as well as generating the 
attacking scenarios with the attacker agents. The final inputs for 
fuzzing are the interleaved ABI invocations and the attack scenarios. 
Generating Inputs for Different Data Types. The ABI 
interfaces for EOSIO smart contracts are in JSON format. Therefore, 
our tool parses the JSON file to extract the data type for each 
parameter. Then EOSFuzzer generates inputs for each data type and 
concatenates them to build the final input for invoking the ABI 
interfaces. 
The primitive numeric data types include the 8-, 16-, 32-, and 64-
bit integer and unsigned integer types as well as the 32- and 64-bit 
float-point types. For those data types, EOSFuzzer can randomly 
generate the maximum, or the minimum, or a random value within 
the input domain.  
For the Boolean data type, the input generation algorithm will 
random return true (1) or false (0) values. For the string data type, 
our input generation algorithm will first build a candidate pool of 
strings with static analysis. More specifically, EOSFuzzer will iterate 
the data areas defining the constant data and collect all constant 
strings in the area as a pool of candidate strings. Then the EOSFuzzer 
will randomly return a string from the candidate pool for a string 
parameter during input generation. 
For the asset data type, the algorithm will return random number 
of EOS tokens. For the symbol data type, the algorithm will only 
return the type EOS. In another word, we will mainly target at smart 
contract functions related to EOS token rather than other tokens. 
The name data type represents the name of smart contracts. 
Currently, our tool will return the name of the smart contract under 
test as input for the parameter of name data type. Similarly, for the 
public_key data type, we will return the address of the current smart 
contract under test. This is because many of the ABIs are only 
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authorized to work on the current smart contract under test. The use 
of the name and public_key of other relevant smart contracts may 
further require the analysis of the relationships among smart 
contracts within a project, which we left as a future work. 
For the array data type, our algorithm will iteratively generate 
inputs for its members of primitive data type. For struct data type, 
our algorithm will iteratively generate inputs for each of its members. 
If its member is of struct data type, the algorithm will also proceed 
recursively until primitive types are encountered. 
For each smart contract, the input generation algorithm will 
generate one test suite containing a set of test cases. Each test case is 
a combination of ABI function invocations and attacking interactions 
(from the agent contracts) to the smart contract under fuzzing. The 
number of function invocations and attacking interactions within a 
test case is of random length and can be configured within 
EOSFuzzer.  
Generating Seeds for the Memo Parameter. The memo 
argument is an argument used in the transfer function. Based on our 
analysis, we found that the sender and the receiver may use a memo 
argument of string type to confirm and guard a transfer action. To 
generate seeds for the memo parameter, our algorithm will perform 
static analysis on the smart contract under test to extract the strings 
used in the transfer function.  
Table  8. The Static Analysis to Extract Candidate Memo Strings 
1 vector<string> getMemoStrings(vector wast, string param) { 
2 vector<string> memos 
3 set<string> offsets 
4 for func in all functions with signature like param 
5 for instruction contains “"i32.const"” { 
6 extract offset from instruction 
7 offsets.insert(offset) 
8 }  
9 for offset in offsets  
10 foreach instruction in data area contains offset { 
11 extract string from instruction 
12 memos.insert(string) 
13 } 
14 return memos 
15 } 
 
As shown in Table  8, the function getMemoStrings extracts the 
candidate strings that may be used to compare with the memo 
argument within the transfer function. The wast parameter is the 
WebAssembly text format of the smart contract under fuzzing. 
EOSFuzzer uses the wasm2wat tool [33] to translate wasm bytecode 
to wast representation. The param is a string representing the data 
types of the return value and parameters of the transfer function (i.e., 
the string “(param i32 i64 i64 i32 i32)”). At line 4, the algorithm 
iterates all functions with signatures like the transfer function (i.e., 
having the same type of parameters and return value). Within each 
function, it iterates each instruction containing the use of constant 
values in the code (i.e., containing i32.const), and it extracts the 
offset of the corresponding constant variable in such functions (line 4 
to 7). Finally, the algorithm iterates the data areas defining the 
constant data, locates the string corresponding to the offset (if it is of 
type string), and saves it in the vector memos as candidates for the 
memo parameter (line 9 to 12). 
When there are functions with the same signature as the transfer 
function or when there are other constant strings used in the transfer 
function which are not related with memo parameter, the analysis 
may become imprecise. However, our analysis with the open source 
contracts showed that the memos vector only contains small number 
of irrelevant candidates, which is still effective for fuzzing. 
The Design of Attacker Agents for Faked EOS Transfer. A 
safely written smart contract will check the code is eosio.token when 
the action is transfer within the apply function. Therefore, to trigger 
the fake EOS transfer vulnerability, we used an attacker contract 
called fakeTransferAgent to invoke the transfer function of the smart 
contract under fuzzing with code different from eosio.token. The 
invocation involves two scenarios and both are performed within the 
transfer function of the fakeTransferAgent. One is to invoke the 
transfer function with code equal to the receiver (i.e. the contract 
under fuzzing) while the other is to invoke the transfer function with 
code different from both the receiver and eosio.token. As a result, the 
agent contract will perform two possible attacks on the smart contract 
under fuzzing.  
One attack is to perform an inline function call to the transfer 
function of the smart contract under fuzzing. In another word, our 
tool deliberately avoids using the eosio.token contract to perform the 
transfer action. In this attack, the code is equal to receiver (i.e., the 
smart contract under fuzzing).  
The other kind of attack is to first use the cleos tool to call the 
transfer function of the fakeTransferAgent smart contract. Then, the 
fakeTransferAgent smart contract will forward the action to the smart 
contract under fuzzing through require_recipient. In this way, the 
smart contract under fuzzing will receive an transfer action with code 
equal to fakeTransferAgent, which is different from both eosio.token 
and itself (the receiver). 
Finally, if the transfer function of smart contract under fuzzing is 
successfully triggered by the attack, it will be considered vulnerable. 
The Design of the Attacker Agents for Forged Transfer 
Notification. To effectively trigger the forged transfer notification 
vulnerability, we designed a notifier agent contract to mount the 
attack. To initiate the attack, EOSFuzzer will first send some EOS to 
the notifier contract through the eosio.token smart contract.  The 
notifier contract in turn will forward the transfer action to the smart 
contract under fuzzing through the require_recipient() function. 
Finally, the vulnerability detection module of EOSFuzzer will 
analyze the behavior of the smart contract under fuzzing on receiving 
the notification to determine whether it is vulnerable or not. 
4.3 The Fuzzing Execution Engine 
Having generated the inputs for fuzzing the smart contracts, the 
fuzzing execution engine is responsible for executing the inputs 
against the EOSIO smart contract. The fuzzing execution engine 
makes use of the cleos tool to interact with the smart contract. Within 
our design, the EOSFuzzer creates a pipe to communicate with the 
cleos process. It invokes the push action command of cleos tool to 
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interact with the ABI interfaces of the smart contract under fuzzing 
or with the agent contracts.  
For each smart contract, the input generation algorithm will 
generate a set of test cases. Each test case is a combination of ABI 
function invocations and attacking interactions (from the agent 
contracts) to the smart contract under fuzzing. When a test case 
finishes execution, EOSFuzzer will reset the testnet. On the one hand, 
resetting the testnet will lead to extra time cost. On the other hand, 
resetting the testnet will make the debugging easier since the 
execution trace is shorter. In this way, we want to make a tradeoff 
between fuzzing efficiency and debuggability after fuzzing.  
When the execution of test cases ends, EOSFuzzer will start 
reading the instrumentation logs generated during execution and 
invoke the vulnerability detection module to analyze and report the 
vulnerability detection results.  
4.4 Wasm VM Instrumentation 
To support the extensible analysis of vulnerabilities, we must 
carefully instrument the Wasm VM to collect information about 
opcodes and operands invoked during execution. This includes those 
control-flow related opcode, the unary opcode, the binary opcode, 
and their operands. Whenever an opcode is executed, the 
instrumentation will generate a line recording the opcode, the 
operands, and the results (if there is any) within the opcode log file. 
Although not all information within the opcode log file are used for 
detecting the vulnerabilities studied in this work, the instrumentation 
log is design to be general for the analysis of new vulnerabilities in 
the future.  
In particular, the CallIndirect opcode is instrumented because 
each invocation of the execute_action within the apply function will 
lead to the execution of CallIndirect opcode. Therefore, this opcode 
implies the invocation of an ABI function within the smart contract 
under test. Furthermore, we have also instrumented the Wasm API 
interface implementation code to collect information on whether the 
block information is queried during smart contract execution. To be 
specific, we have instrumented the tapos_block_num() and the 
tapos_block_prefix() functions.  
Finally, we have also instrumented the transfer function of 
eosio.token system smart contract, which is used in EOSIO platform 
for EOS transfer. Instrumenting this function will help us understand 
whether EOS transfer actually happened during smart contract 
execution. 
4.5 Test Oracles for Vulnerability Detection 
In this section, we present the test oracles for vulnerability 
detection. 
Fake EOS Transfer. To trigger the fake EOS transfer 
vulnerability, we used an attacker contract called fakeTransferAgent 
to perform two possible actions within its own transfer function. One 
is to directly perform an inline function call to the transfer function 
of the smart contract under fuzzing while the other is to forward a 
transfer action to the smart contract under fuzzing with 
require_recipient. 
The test oracle to detect the fake EOS transfer vulnerability under 
the designed attacking scenarios is:  
CanReceiveEOS & TransferCalled 
The CanReceiveEOS test oracle is to check whether the smart 
contract can receive EOS rather than other tokens. During our 
implementation, we send some EOS to the smart contract under 
fuzzing through the eosio.token contract, and then we check whether 
the transfer function of the smart contract is invoked. Because at least 
two member functions will be called during the attacking scenario 
(i.e., the transfer function of eosio.token and the transfer function of 
the smart contract under fuzzing), EOSFuzzer will check whether the 
CallIndirect opcode has been executed at least 2 times within its 
implementation accordingly. 
The TransferCalled test oracle is to check whether the transfer 
function of the smart contract under fuzzing can be successfully 
triggered by the fakeTransferAgent. Similar to CanReceiveEOS, 
EOSFuzzer checks whether the CallIndirect opcode has been 
executed for at least 2 times (i.e., one for the transfer function of 
fakeTransferAgent and the other for the transfer function of the smart 
contract under fuzzing). Since the attacking scenario is well 
controlled by our agent contract, we can be sure that the transfer 
function is the only ABI function invoked in the smart contract under 
fuzzing. Therefore, the appearance of the second CallIndirect opcode 
corresponds to the invocation of the transfer function rather than 
other ABI functions within the smart contract under fuzzing. 
Forged Transfer Notification. As presented in previous sections, 
to detect forged transfer notification vulnerability, the EOSFuzzer 
makes use of a notifier agent to send a forged notification to the 
smart contract under fuzzing.  
The test oracles to detect forged transfer notification is as follows: 
TransferCalled & !CheckRecipient 
The TransferCalled sub-oracle is to check whether the transfer 
function of the smart contract under fuzzing is invoked during the 
attacking scenario. Within the call chain of our attack scenarios, if 
the transfer function of the smart contract is called, at least three ABI 
functions must be invoked. These corresponds to the transfer 
functions of eosio.token contract, the notifier contract, and the smart 
contract under fuzzing. Each invocation of a member function will 
lead to the execution of a CallIndirect opcode. Therefore, when 
realizing the oracle TransferCalled, EOSFuzzer checks whether there 
are at least 3 CallIndirect opcode executed during our attack. At the 
same time, EOSFuzzer also records the line number of the third 
CallIndirect opcode within the opcode log file for ease of further 
analysis, which corresponds to the starting position of the transfer 
function within the smart contract under fuzzing.  
The !CheckRecipient condition is to check the smart contract 
under fuzzing has not checked whether it is the real recipient of the 
EOS transfer in all attacks by the notifier agent. To realize the sub-
oracle !CheckRecipient, EOSFuzzer first checks whether there is any 
execution of comparison opcode (i.e., Eq or Ne) between the notifier 
contract (the actual receiver of EOS) and the smart contract under 
fuzzing in one round of attack by the notifier agent. The comparison 
starts from the starting position of the transfer function of the smart 
contract under fuzzing recorded in the opcode log file during the 
previous step. It should be noted that directly checking the instruction 
on comparing the to and _self parameters of the transfer function may 
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be imprecise because EOSIO does not enforce the consistency 
between the ABI interface and the actual implementation.  
During our fuzzing process for a smart contract, EOSFuzzer will 
initiate the attack from the notifier agent many times, 
the !CheckRecipient condition is satisfied only when the check of the 
EOS transfer recipient is not performed in all attacks from the 
notifier agent. Since a Fuzzer may not traverse each path to the code 
for recipient checking, EOSFuzzer may produce false positives when 
reporting Forged Transfer Notification vulnerability. However, when 
the scale of the fuzzing is large, the probability of generating false 
positives will become very low, which is also confirmed by our 
experiment evaluation. 
Block Information Dependency. The test oracle to detect block 
information dependency is as follows: 
BlockInfoRead & EOSTransferCalled 
The BlockInfoRead test oracle checks whether there is any 
invocation of APIs reading block information. During the 
implementation, this is realized through instrumenting the 
tapos_block_num and tapos_block_prefix API. The 
EOSTransferCalled oracle checks whether the transfer function of 
the eosio.token smart contract is called. The EOSFuzzer realizes this 
by simply instrumenting the transfer function of eosio.token system 
smart contract and re-deploying it within EOSIO. 
4.5 Discussions 
In this section, we discuss the possible extensions to EOSFuzzer 
in two aspects.  
First, EOSFuzzer is designed as a blackbox fuzzer, but it can be 
also extended to be a grey-box fuzzer. The key to the extension is to 
collect code coverage information during fuzzing process. Currently, 
EOSFuzzer instruments all kinds of bytecode instructions within 
WASM VM. We can extend EOSFuzzer by collecting branch 
coverage information within VM instrumentation: whenever a branch 
instruction is encountered, we can log the location of the two 
branches as well as the coverage of new branch. The incremental 
branch coverage information can be used to guide the mutation-based 
grey-box fuzzing process. New mutation and selection strategies can 
be proposed to further improve the effectiveness of the fuzzer.  
Second, EOSFuzzer can also be extended to support the detection 
of new vulnerabilities. For example, the rollback vulnerability [10] is 
a vulnerability within the smart contracts of gambling DApp. In 
essence, the vulnerability lies in the reveal function of the gambling 
smart contract where all the actions are located in a single transaction. 
As a result, an attacker can revert the whole transaction to restore its 
balance whenever it loses the gambling game. We can extend 
EOSFuzzer to use another attacker agent to realize the above 
attacking scenarios. The transfer of EOS to the contract under 
fuzzing, the invocation of the reveal function, the checking of the 
balance of the attacker agent, and the invocation of the revert 
operation can all be easily supported by EOSFuzzer framework 
through simple extension. 
5 Experiment and Results Analysis 
In this section, we present our fuzzing experiment to evaluate the 
vulnerability detection effectiveness of the EOSFuzzer.  
5.1 Subject Programs 
The subject programs used in our experimental study include 82 
open source EOSIO smart contracts and 3881 smart contracts without 
source code. The 82 open source smart contracts are mainly used to 
manually verify the effectiveness of our tool. However, collecting 
large number of EOSIO smart contracts with source code is difficult 
because most EOSIO DApps are not open-source. The 3881 smart 
contracts without source code contain Wasm bytecode and ABI file 
only, which are used to evaluate our tool at scale. For the smart 
contracts with source code, we first compiled them into bytecode and 
then deployed them in our testnet for fuzzing. For the smart contracts 
with Wasm bytecode only, we directly deployed them within our 
testnet.  
5.2 Experiment Setup 
The experiment was performed within a docker. The host for the 
docker was a desktop equipped with 8 cores of Intel® Core™ i7-
6700 CPU @ 3.4GHz and 16GB of memory. The host was running 
Ubuntu 16.04.1 and Docker version 18.06.1. Furthermore, the docker 
was running Ubuntu 18.04.4. We ran the instrumented EOSIO client 
(node) and the EOSFuzzer within the Ubuntu OS in the docker. The 
EOSIO client used is the nodeos version 1.5.2. And the EOSFuzzer 
talks to the EOSIO node through the cleos tool. 
Before performing the fuzzing experiment, we must properly 
configure the EOSIO testnet. First, we started the keosd wallet to 
provide key manager service daemon for storing private keys and 
signing digital messages. Second, we ran the instrumented nodeos 
daemon to start the single node testnet. Third, we deployed the 
instrumented eosio.token system smart contract and the attacker 
agent contracts. Fourth, we created 2 EOSIO accounts to cooperate 
with the attacker agent contracts for performing EOS transfer during 
attack. Finally, we deploy the smart contracts under fuzzing on the 
EOSIO testnet. The deployed smart contracts include 3881 smart 
contracts without source code and 82 smart contracts with source 
code.  
When the EOSIO testnet had been configured, we further 
configured EOSFuzzer to perform around 1000 interleaved ABI 
function invocations and attacks from agent contracts in total for 
each smart contract. Finally, we started to perform fuzzing with the 
EOSFuzzer against the deployed smart contracts. 
5.3 Experiments and Results Analysis 
In this section, we first present the results of EOSFuzzer on 
contracts with and without source code. Then we further compare the 
EOSFuzzer and EVulHunter tool [17] in terms of vulnerability 
detection effectiveness. The EVulHunter is an EOSIO smart contract 
vulnerability detection tool based on static analysis. Finally, we 
present the efficiency of EOSFuzzer in terms of vulnerability 
detection. 
EOSFuzzer Results on Contracts with Source Code. The 
vulnerability detection result of EOSFuzzer is shown in Table  9. The 
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column Total represents the total number of smart contracts under 
analysis. The column Reported, FP, and FN represents the number of 
vulnerabilities, false positive cases and false negative cases reported 
for the corresponding vulnerability type, respectively. We manually 
checked the source code of the 82 smart contracts to identify the false 
positive or false negative cases. 
Table  9. Results of EOSFuzzer on Smart Contracts with Source 
Code 
Vulnerability Total EOSFuzzer Reported FP FN 
Block Info. Dependency 82 2 0 1 
Forged Transfer Notification 82 4 0 0 
Fake EOS Transfer 82 2 1 0 
 
Among the 82 smart contracts, the EOSFuzzer has detected 2 
block dependency vulnerabilities. Both of them are confirmed with 
our manual check. There is one false negative case by EOSFuzzer for 
the block dependency vulnerability. 
The smart contract lottery10 is the false negative case of 
EOSFuzzer. As shown in Table  10, the transferact function is 
designated to handle the transfer of EOS for making a bet. However, 
the contract only accepts EOS transfer with some pre-determined 
amount (i.e., 1000, 10000, 100000…). Moreover, the contract further 
requires the 10th invocation of the transfer function with the pre-
determined amount can actually make the bet, which makes the 
EOSFuzzer hard to trigger without a large-scale fuzzing effort. In 
general, performing a very large-scale fuzzing campaign against a 
smart contract or using feedback mechanisms for fuzzing may help 
expose the vulnerability, which is left as a future work. 
Table  10. False Negative Case of Block Info. Dependency by 
EOSFuzzer  
1 class lottery10 : public eosio::contract { 
2 … 
3 void transferact(uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code) { 
4 //function to handle transfer 
5 … 
6 int64_t amount = data.quantity.amount; 
7 if (amount == 1000 || amount == 10000 || amount == 100000 
|| amount == 1000000 || amount == 10000000) { 
8 //accept the bet   
9 … 
10 }; 
 
For the Forged Transfer Notification vulnerability, the 
EOSFuzzer has identified 4 smart contracts. After manual checking 
all the 82 smart contracts, we confirmed that EOSFuzzer reports 
neither false positives nor false negatives. 
For the Fake EOS Transfer Vulnerability, EOSFuzzer identified 2 
vulnerabilities out of the 82 smart contracts. After manual checking, 
we confirmed that EOSFuzzer reports no false negatives. But one of 
the identified vulnerable contracts (called vigor) is a false positive 
case.  
Table  11. A False Positive Case of Fake EOS Transfer by 
EOSFuzzer 
1 CONTRACT vigor: public eosio::contract { 
2 … 
3 [[noreturn]] void apply(uint64_t receiver, uint64_t code, 
uint64_t action) { 
4 if((code==name("eosio.token").value || 
5 code==name("vig111111111").value || 
6 code==name("dummytokens1").value) &&  
7 action==name("transfer").value) { 
8 eosio::execute_action(name(receiver),name(code),&vigor::assetin); 
9 } 
10 if (code == receiver) { 
11 switch (action) { //typical action mapping workflow 
12 EOSIO_DISPATCH_HELPER(vigor, (create) (transfer)…)  
13 }   
14 } 
15 } 
 
As show in Table  11, the smart contract vigor is a false positive 
case of Fake EOS Transfer reported by EOSFuzzer. In typical 
workflow, the apply function will use the transfer function to handle 
the transfer of EOS token, which is also the assumption our test 
oracle implementation based on. However, within the vigor contract, 
the assetin function (rather than the transfer function) is used to 
handle the transfer of EOS (line 4 to 8). Therefore, the sub-oracle can 
CanReceiveEOS can be satisfied (i.e., CallIndirect opcode has been 
executed for at least 2 times). Furthermore, when the attacker agent 
performs an inline invocation of the transfer function on vigor, the 
transfer function can still be called through the default dispatcher 
macro (line 10 to 12). So, the sub-oracle TransferCalled can also be 
satisfied (since the CallIndirect opcode has been executed for at least 
2 times). Since both sub-oracles are satisfied, our EOSFuzzer 
wrongly reports the contract as a Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability. 
The reason for the false positive is due to the fact that vigor uses a 
different function called assetin rather than the function transfer to 
handle EOS transfer, which are hard to know without analyzing the 
source code. However, we consider the use of functions other than 
transfer to handle EOS transfer as unusual for EOSIO smart 
contracts.  
Comparison of EOSFuzzer and EVulHunter. In this section, 
we further compare EOSFuzzer with the EVulHunter tool for 
vulnerability detection as shown in Table  12. Since the EVulHunter 
tool does not the support the detection of Block Information 
Dependency vulnerability, we compare EOSFuzzer and EVulHunter 
in terms of the Forged Transfer Notification and Fake EOS Transfer 
vulnerability only. 
Table  12. Comparison of EOSFuzzer and EVulHunter 
Vulnerability Total EOSFuzzer EVulHunter Reported FP FN Reported FP FN 
Forged Transfer  
Notification 82 4 0 0 12 10 2 
Fake EOS Transfer 82 2 1 0 9 8 0 
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Among the 82 smart contracts, the EVulHunter successfully 
analyzed 74 smart contracts. It fails to generate output for the other 8 
contracts. Within the 74 smart contracts, The EVulHunter has 
reported 12 smart contracts with Forged Transfer Notification 
vulnerability. However, after manual check, we found 10 of them are 
false positives. Furthermore, EVulHunter missed 2 vulnerable smart 
contracts. Therefore, the EOSFuzzer tool outperforms the 
EVulHunter when detecting Forged Transfer Notification 
vulnerability. 
As shown in Table  13, the smart contract salescon is a false 
positive case for forged transfer notification vulnerability by 
EVulHunter. It uses the assertion statements (i.e., eosio_assert) to 
perform conditional checks. However, the EVulHunter tool seems 
only works well with conditional checks using if statement, leading 
to false positives when assertion is used. During our manual 
confirmation, when we change the assertion statement to if statement 
in the contract, the EVulHunter tool will not generate the false 
positive any more.  
Table  13. A False Positive Case for Forged Transfer Notif. by 
EVulHunter 
1 class [[eosio::contract]] salescon : public eosio::contract { 
2 … 
3 void salescon::transfer(name from, name to, asset quantity, string 
memo) 
4 {… 
5 eosio_assert(from == buyer, "Transfer must come from buyer"); 
6 eosio_assert(to == _self, "Contract was not the recipient"); 
7 eosio_assert(quantity.symbol.is_valid(), "Invalid quantity"); 
8 … 
One false negative case for forged transfer notification 
vulnerability by the EVulHunter tool is the smart contract vigor. 
During its analysis, the EVulHunter tool fails to find any path leading 
to the indirect call. However, the EOSFuzzer tool did find a path 
leading to the indirect call during the fuzzing process. Therefore, the 
EVulHunter seems not precise enough during its static analysis 
process.  
For the Fake EOS Transfer Vulnerability, EOSFuzzer identified 2 
vulnerabilities while the EVulHunter tool reported 9 vulnerabilities. 
However, after manual check, we found 8 of the 9 vulnerabilities 
reported by EVulHunter are actually false positives. In contrast, only 
1 of the 2 vulnerabilities reported by EOSFuzzer is false positive. 
Therefore, for Fake EOS Transfer Vulnerability, EOSFuzzer incurs 
much lower false positives than EVulHunter. 
As shown in Table  14, the token smart contract is reported by 
EVulHunter as Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability. However, within 
the token contract, it uses the EOSIO_ABI macro for default action 
mapping. The EOSIO_ABI can only handle scenarios where code is 
equal to self. Therefore, the token contract cannot handle EOS 
transfer from the eosio.token contract. It is only a contract handling 
tokens other than EOS. Therefore, the token contract is a false 
positive case of EVulHunter. 
 
Table  14. A False Positive Case for Fake EOS Transfer by 
EVulHunter 
1 class token: public contract { 
2 … 
3 }; 
4 EOSIO_ABI( eosio::token, (create)(issue)(transfer) ) 
5 //macro for default action mapping 
 
EOSFuzzer Results on Contract without Source Code. We 
have also performed fuzzing on 3881 EOSIO smart contract with 
bytecode and ABI only. As shown in Table  15, the EOSFuzzer has 
identified 3 Block Information Dependency vulnerabilities, 183 
Forged Transfer Notification vulnerabilities, and 265 Fake EOS 
Transfer vulnerabilities. Among the 3881 smart contracts, the 
percentage of Block Information dependency, Forged Transfer 
Notification, and Fake EOS Transfer are 0.07%, 4.72%, and 6.83%, 
respectively. Without source code, it is hard to manually verify those 
reported smart contracts to identify the precise number of false 
positives and false negatives. But the results give us an estimation of 
the number of vulnerable smart contracts in the wild.  
Considering the potential large number of Forged Transfer 
Notification and Fake EOS Transfer vulnerability, the developers are 
recommended to perform security check and harden their contract 
before releasing their EOSIO smart contract to public. 
Table  15. Results of EOSFuzzer on Smart Contracts without 
Source Code 
Vulnerability Total Vulnerabilities Detected Percentage 
Block Info. Dependency 3881 3 0.07% 
Forged Transfer  
Notification 3881 183 4.72% 
Fake EOS Transfer 3881 265 6.83% 
 
Efficiency of EOSFuzzer. When fuzzing each contract, we 
configured EOSFuzzer to perform around 1000 interleaved ABI 
function invocations and attacks from agent contracts in total for 
each smart contract. For each contract, the fuzzing experiment takes 
around 90 seconds on average, which is small based on the hardware 
configurations of our experiment. Furthermore, the average 
invocations per second is around 11, which is fast enough for 
comprehensive fuzzing. This is partly due to the high transaction 
speed of EOS based on the DPOS consensus protocol. Therefore, 
EOSFuzzer is also efficient for EOSIO smart contract vulnerability 
detection. 
6 Mounting Attacks on Vulnerable Contracts 
We have also successfully mounted an attack on a smart contract 
called diamond1 to earn EOS within our testnet. Since diamond1 
provides no source code, we performed fuzzing on its bytecode based 
on its ABI interfaces. In addition to the test oracles defined within 
EOSFuzzer, we also checked whether the EOS balance of the 
diamond1 is reduced after each ABI invocation (Initialized to be 
1000 EOS before fuzzing). In another word, we wanted to ensure that 
the asset of the contract under fuzzing was lost through the attack. 
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Within 7 ABI invocations, the EOSFuzzer not only successfully 
triggered the Forge Transfer Notification vulnerability, but it also 
successfully made a bet and earned a reward (26.46 EOS) without 
using a single EOS. The detailed attacking process is as follows: 
During the first ABI invocation, the EOSFuzzer performed an 
EOS transfer to the diamond1 smart contract and checked whether its 
transfer function was invoked. This was to check whether diamond1 
could receive EOS. During the following 3 ABI invocations, the 
EOSFuzzer performed the Forged Transfer Notification attacks by 
transferring EOS to the notifier agent contract from a sender account. 
The notifier agent contract will send the notification to the diamond1 
smart contract through the require_recipient function. For all 3 
invocations, the Forged Transfer Notification were all triggered, and 
EOSFuzzer successfully made a bet without spending any EOS. 
During the 5th invocation, the EOSFuzzer performed the Fake EOS 
Transfer attack with the agent contract to perform an inline 
invocation to the diamond1 smart contract. However, no Fake EOS 
Transfer vulnerability was triggered. During the 6th invocation, 
EOSFuzzer invoked the deposit ABI function of diamond1. However, 
its balance was not changed. Finally, during the 7th ABI invocation, 
EOSFuzzer invoked the endlottery ABI function of the diamond1 
smart contract, which ended the betting process and announced the 
betting results. Note that the endlottery ABI function can also be 
triggered from the website of the gambling game.  
At the end of the last invocation, EOSFuzzer found that the 
balance of diamond1 smart contract reduced to 973.54 EOS while the 
balance of the sender account increased from 1000 to 1026.46. The 
logs further confirmed the success of the attack: the diamond1 smart 
contract considered the sender account had successfully made a bet 
during the Forged Transfer Notification attack, it announced the 
sender account as the winner, and it had sent 26.46 EOS to the sender 
account as the reward. However, the sender account only sent the 
notifier agent contract some EOS for conspiracy, it earned 26.46 
EOS without any stake. 
7 Related Work 
In this section, we present closely related work on smart contract 
vulnerability detection and fuzzing techniques.  
7.1 Smart Contract Vulnerability Detection 
Parizi et al. [15] carry out an extensive experimental assessment 
of current static smart contracts security testing tools for the 
Ethereum smart contracts. Tsankov et al. proposed the Securify tool 
for smart contract vulnerability detection. The Securify tool [18] is a 
scalable security analyzer for Ethereum smart contracts and it can 
prove contract behaviors as safe/unsafe with respect to a given 
property. Abdellatif and Brousmiche [1] used a formal modeling 
approach to verify a smart contract behavior in its execution 
environment. They further analyzed the security of contracts with a 
statistical model checking approach. 
Luu et al [12] designed Oyente, a symbolic verification tool for 
Ethereum smart contract. Oyente builds the control-flow graph of 
smart contracts and then performs symbolic execution on the control 
flow graph while checking whether there exist any vulnerable 
patterns. Nikolic et al. [14] designed MAIAN, a symbolic execution 
tool for reasoning about tracing properties to detect vulnerable 
Ethereum smart contracts. It specified three typical smart contracts 
vulnerabilities based on trace properties. The MAIAN can efficiently 
detect the greedy, the prodigal and the suicidal contracts through 
symbolic execution. Hirai [11] used Isabelle/HOL tool to verify the 
smart contract called Deed, which is part of the Ethereum Name 
Service implementation. Specifically, the work verifies the oracle 
that only the owner of Deed could decrease its balance. Furthermore, 
they also found the EVM implementation is poorly tested during the 
verification process. 
Chen et al. [5] proposed the TokenScope tool, which 
automatically checks whether the behaviors of the token contracts are 
consistent with the ERC–20 standards. Nguyen et al. proposed the 
sFuzz tool [7], which combined the strategy in the AFL fuzzer and an 
efficient lightweight multi-objective adaptive strategy targeting those 
hard-to-cover branches. The evaluation shows the sFuzz tool is 
efficient and effective to achieve high code coverage and to detect 
vulnerabilities. Wang et al. [19] proposed the VULTRON tool, which 
can precisely detect irregular transactions in smart contracts due to 
various types of adversarial exploits. It provided a general way to 
solve the test oracle problem for smart contract vulnerability 
detection. 
The techniques reviewed above are in general effective to detect 
the vulnerabilities or bugs within Ethereum smart contracts. However, 
they are not specifically designed to support the detection of 
vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts.  
The EVulHunter [17] is a static analysis tool to detect 
vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts. However, it fails to 
generate results for a number of EOSIO smart contracts and it 
generates many false negatives and false positives for vulnerability 
reporting. EOSAFE [10] is another static analysis framework to 
detect vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts based on 
symbolic execution. We believe dynamic fuzzing and static analysis 
are two complementary techniques for EOSIO smart contract 
vulnerability detection. 
7.2 Fuzzing Techniques for Vulnerability Detection 
There are many works on fuzzing techniques for vulnerability 
detection.  
GodeFroid [9] et al. proposed to enhance whitebox fuzzing of 
complex structured-input applications with a grammar-based 
specification of their valid inputs. Their test data generation 
algorithm combines symbolic execution and constraint solving to 
improve the fuzzing process. Wang et al. proposed TaintScope [20], 
an automatic fuzzing system using dynamic taint analysis and 
symbolic execution techniques. TaintScope can identify checksum 
fields in input instances, locate checksum-based integrity checks by 
using branch profiling techniques, and bypass such checks via 
control flow alteration. 
Dai et al. [6] proposed the configuration fuzzing technique, which 
randomly modifies the configuration of the running application at 
certain execution points to check for vulnerabilities. Ganesh realized 
the BuzzFuzz tool [8], which uses dynamic taint tracing to 
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automatically locate regions of original seed input files that influence 
values used at key program attack points. The BuzzFuzz tool then 
automatically generates new fuzzed test input files by fuzzing these 
identified regions of the original seed input files. 
Chen et al. [3] proposed a mutation-based fuzzer called Angora, 
which proposed to use scalable byte-level taint tracking, context-
sensitive branch count, search based on gradient descent, and input 
length exploration techniques to solve path constraints efficiently. 
Lyu et al. [13] proposed a novel mutation scheduling scheme, which 
made mutation-based fuzzer to discover vulnerabilities more 
efficiently. Chen et al. [4] proposed a globally asynchronous and 
locally synchronous (GALS) seed synchronization mechanism to 
seamlessly ensemble base fuzzer for better performance. 
You et al. [21] proposed the ProFuzzer, which automatically 
recovered and understood input fields of critical importance to 
vulnerability discovery during a fuzzing process. The fuzzer can 
intelligently adapt the mutation strategy to enhance the chance of 
hitting zero-day targets. 
In general, different from EOSFuzzer, the fuzzing techniques 
reviewed aboved are not specifically designed for detecting 
vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts.  
There are also interesting works on stateful fuzzing techniques. 
The AFLnet takes a mutational approach and uses state-feedback to 
guide the fuzzing process of network protocols [16]. The REST-ler [2] 
is a stateful automatic intelligent REST API security-testing tool. 
REST-ler generates tests intelligently by inferring dependencies 
among request types declared in the Swagger specification. It also 
analyzes dynamic feedback from responses observed during prior test 
executions in order to generate new tests. Currently, the fuzzing 
performed by EOSFuzzer is stateless. We may extend EOSFuzzer to 
perform stateful fuzzing with the support of data-flow analysis in the 
future work. 
9 Conclusions and Future Work 
The vulnerabilities within the EOSIO smart contracts have 
resulted in significant loss for its users. Therefore, effective tools for 
detecting the vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contract are needed. 
In this work, we present EOSFuzzer, a black-box fuzzing tool to 
automatically detect vulnerabilities within EOSIO smart contracts. 
Within EOSFuzzer, we have proposed effective attacking scenarios 
as well as invocations to ABI interfaces to perform comprehensive 
fuzzing on EOSIO smart contracts. Furthermore, we have also 
defined and realized test oracles to detect three typical vulnerabilities 
for EOSIO smart contracts. Our fuzzing experiment showed that 
EOSFuzzer is effective and efficient to detect vulnerabilities within 
EOSIO smart contracts for practical use. In particular, EOSFuzzer 
has successfully mounted attacks on EOSIO smart contract without 
source code to make bets without spending any EOS. 
For future work, we would like to extend the EOSFuzzer to 
support the detection of new types of vulnerabilities in EOSIO smart 
contracts. We also plan to improve the search strategies of 
EOSFuzzer during fuzzing to improve its vulnerability detection 
effectiveness for complex smart contract 
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